Saturday, August 8, 2009
Saturday, May 31, 2008
Sunday, May 18, 2008
Abstract
My essay does not have a question as much as a theme. I am interested in the idea of a One World State (OWS), and the positives and negatives of such a system. In the long run, I am a proponent of the OWS, so that is the position from which I will approach the essay.
The main text I’m focusing on is Kant’s Perpetual Peace. Part of the reason I support the One World State is because I believe it is an institution that could assist humanity in reaching the kind of peace Kant is discussing. What I found interesting is that Kant seems to want to reject the OWS in favour of keeping the status quo of segregated nation-states: one of the major contributors to conflict (in my opinion). So the structure of my essay will follow that of Kant’s paper, albeit indirectly, because Kant’s investigation does not always focus on the issue of the OWS.
There are specific areas, such as sections 2 and 3 of the First Supplement on pages 113-114, that I will pick apart thoroughly. Here, Kant denies that we should be striving towards the OWS because of his strong support of the nation-state system. I will attempt to argue against this, by dismissing Kant’s fears regarding despotism, anarchy, and lack of power as unfounded, especially within the context of our modern times.
Since beginning planning this essay, I have read Habermas’s Two Hundred Years’ Hindsight and realised that our arguments are somewhat similar. So Habermas will be my scholarly backup; not informing my opinions and arguments, but supporting them where necessary. To a lesser degree, I will also draw from O’Neill’s Bounds of Justice, specifically Chapter 9.
I also intend to discuss issues of governance. That is, what kind of governmental system would be most practical for the OWS (democracy, monarchy, tyranny, etc.) and which, if any, would most contribute to Kant’s idea of Perpetual Peace. Space permitting, I also will to argue that Capitalism as we now understand it could not survive under any OWS striving for Perpetual Peace. Finally (again, space permitting) I will look at whether or not Perpetual Peace is really a goal to which we should be striving in the first place, thus raising discussion of issues such as pacifism and militarism.
My final conclusion is that, assuming the goal of Perpetual Peace, the One World State should be a parallel goal. While it may not be practical now, or even in the near future, it is still an ideal system to which we should be striving.
Friday, May 16, 2008
Pogge's Vertical Distribution of Power and Sovereignty
Hey all just a brief abstract in case you have some ideas,
In Pogge's efforts to create a moral cosmopolitan theory he tries to establish a means of vertically distributing power in order to both allow universal politically enshrined rights whilst sustaining local communal differences. In this essay I will look to criticise two of the main theoretical bases of his argument that seek to justify this new system of governance and that seek to reestablish our ideas about state borders and sovereignty.
Firstly, Pogge reconsiders the concept of state sovereignty, dividing between sovereignty and absolute sovereignty in order to step around complaints against world governance that have been raised by other cosmopolitans such as Kant and O'Neill. However, does his concept of the 'centralization and decentralization' as opposed to a 'world state' truly succeed in both fitting in with political concepts of sovereignty whilst still acheiving his cosmopolitan ends? Also, does his defense of this structural form rely on practical reasoning based on what we have seen already, whilst ignoring the new logical dangers that may arise from this different political structure.
Finally, Pogge establishes two rough rules for the process of shaping and reshaping political units. However, are these rules capable of dealing with the need for cultural identity that even Pogge seeks to retain in his efforts at cosmopolitanism? For one part they seem too firmly entrenched in linking defined geographical boundaries with specific ethnic or cultural groups, which we can see is inadequate in trying to explain some modern examples.
I hope to come out in support of Pogge's unique vertical distribution of power, but first must challenge these controversial aspects to see if they are adequate.
Cheers,
Nick
Wednesday, May 14, 2008
Habermas on Kant and the problems with human rights
Hey everyone!
I had chosen the question about Habermas' hindsight of Kant's proposals for a "perpetual peace", but i really didnt have a clue for deciding the starting point of it and its perspective.
I have to say that last class' discussion kind of helped me to figure out where i should point the focus....i think it should be the justification of human rights, and the problems with them.
I want to explain Habermas' cosmopolitanism, because i think his analysis looks quite sound to me. I want to try to disentangle the puzzle of Habermas' distinction of Moral, Human and Basic rights, in the light of his criticism of Schmitt's accuse of 'moral universalism' to the cosmopolitan order being carried about with the establishment of organizations as the UN.
From what i understand, Habermas' threefold distinction of rights is only formal . Human rights are not borne in morality: they have a juridical character. This means that human rights don't have a moral content, but a moral form, because the form of their validity (i guess Habermas could have chosen a better word than "suprapositive"....) "points beyond the legal order of the nation-state" (as we read in p 137).
I think it is important to acknowledge that in a cosmopolitan order there cannot be space for that sort of "fascism of morality" criticized by Schmitt, because in that world-scenario the legal order, and not morality itself would prosecute as crimes violations of human rights. It is as if within the structural (formal) domain of moral universalism the law came to be stretched to the very borders of the domain, and not the other way round: human rights are not inflated by any moral content. Schmitt's concerns about a morality that turns humanity into bestiality should not constitute a problem in a cosmopolitan order, because morality is only a form for basic rights that does not undermines their legal force.
I have to admit that this is just an idea and i haven't structured yet the paper, so if anyone has an advice it's more than welcome!
Cheers
Giacomo
I had chosen the question about Habermas' hindsight of Kant's proposals for a "perpetual peace", but i really didnt have a clue for deciding the starting point of it and its perspective.
I have to say that last class' discussion kind of helped me to figure out where i should point the focus....i think it should be the justification of human rights, and the problems with them.
I want to explain Habermas' cosmopolitanism, because i think his analysis looks quite sound to me. I want to try to disentangle the puzzle of Habermas' distinction of Moral, Human and Basic rights, in the light of his criticism of Schmitt's accuse of 'moral universalism' to the cosmopolitan order being carried about with the establishment of organizations as the UN.
From what i understand, Habermas' threefold distinction of rights is only formal . Human rights are not borne in morality: they have a juridical character. This means that human rights don't have a moral content, but a moral form, because the form of their validity (i guess Habermas could have chosen a better word than "suprapositive"....) "points beyond the legal order of the nation-state" (as we read in p 137).
I think it is important to acknowledge that in a cosmopolitan order there cannot be space for that sort of "fascism of morality" criticized by Schmitt, because in that world-scenario the legal order, and not morality itself would prosecute as crimes violations of human rights. It is as if within the structural (formal) domain of moral universalism the law came to be stretched to the very borders of the domain, and not the other way round: human rights are not inflated by any moral content. Schmitt's concerns about a morality that turns humanity into bestiality should not constitute a problem in a cosmopolitan order, because morality is only a form for basic rights that does not undermines their legal force.
I have to admit that this is just an idea and i haven't structured yet the paper, so if anyone has an advice it's more than welcome!
Cheers
Giacomo
Essay Abstract: Onora O’Neill’s Kantian Constructivist Approach To Practical Reasoning
Hey all,
I am not sure whether I will deal with scope but this is how the abstract for my essay on O’Neill stands at the moment:
O’Neill attempts to move beyond the impasse between robust ethical realism and ethical scepticism/relativism by means of a form of Kantian constructivism that at once ensures ethical objectivity and avoids relying on problematic metaphysical presuppositions. According to O’Neill’s “third way” it is followability, publicness and universalism of scope that render public reason ethical and accord it its normative force. I will argue that there are four principal problems with O’Neill’s thesis. First, O’Neill fails to establish that the normative force of her brand of practical reasoning is binding in the way she want it to be insofar as she fails to provide unconditioned justification for followability, publicness and universalism of scope. Secondly, O’Neill is guilty of a conceptual confusion in that she confounds everyone being able to follow a particular chain of reasoning with a particular chain of reasoning being ethically sound. Thirdly, O’Neill’s notions of followability and publicness are self-defeating in that they either admit the validity of other forms of practical reasoning or rule out the validity of all forms of practical reasoning, including O’Neill’s own. Finally, by way of a synthesis of these three critiques I will argue that O’Neill’s project is incoherent as a result of her attempt to establish practical reasoning as the unconditioned conditional of the validity of ethical claims. By way of a conclusion I will gesture at a reformulated constructivism that would be immune from the critiques that O’Neillian constructivism is unable to withstand. This “sentimentalist constructivism” would acknowledge the necessarily “ethnocentric” character of ALL forms of practical reasoning.
All the best,
Benjamin
I am not sure whether I will deal with scope but this is how the abstract for my essay on O’Neill stands at the moment:
O’Neill attempts to move beyond the impasse between robust ethical realism and ethical scepticism/relativism by means of a form of Kantian constructivism that at once ensures ethical objectivity and avoids relying on problematic metaphysical presuppositions. According to O’Neill’s “third way” it is followability, publicness and universalism of scope that render public reason ethical and accord it its normative force. I will argue that there are four principal problems with O’Neill’s thesis. First, O’Neill fails to establish that the normative force of her brand of practical reasoning is binding in the way she want it to be insofar as she fails to provide unconditioned justification for followability, publicness and universalism of scope. Secondly, O’Neill is guilty of a conceptual confusion in that she confounds everyone being able to follow a particular chain of reasoning with a particular chain of reasoning being ethically sound. Thirdly, O’Neill’s notions of followability and publicness are self-defeating in that they either admit the validity of other forms of practical reasoning or rule out the validity of all forms of practical reasoning, including O’Neill’s own. Finally, by way of a synthesis of these three critiques I will argue that O’Neill’s project is incoherent as a result of her attempt to establish practical reasoning as the unconditioned conditional of the validity of ethical claims. By way of a conclusion I will gesture at a reformulated constructivism that would be immune from the critiques that O’Neillian constructivism is unable to withstand. This “sentimentalist constructivism” would acknowledge the necessarily “ethnocentric” character of ALL forms of practical reasoning.
All the best,
Benjamin
Monday, May 12, 2008
Essay abstract: O'Neill's requirement of followability
Hello everyone,
In my essay I intend to examine the requirement of followability which O'Neill argues is fundamental for thought to count as reasoned. O'Neill claims that anything that is to count as reasoning must be followable (or, at various times, intelligible, acceptable, accessible or cogent) to all relevant others.
Firstly, I will consider the way O'Neill actually uses the concept, since O'Neill's description of the concept on its own appears too vague and chimerical to be a meaningful requirement on reasoned thought. I will argue that an examination of the way O'Neill actually deploys the requirement against rival theories will reveal that O'Neill trades heavily upon an equivocation in her concept of followability. It appears that there are two possible senses in which O'Neill uses followability:
And it is indeed this strong sense of followability which O'Neill appears to rely upon when she concludes that all non-Kantian-constructivist moral theories are not followable by all relevant others. These theories are not followable because, O'Neill argues, they appear arbitrary or incomprehensible to people who do not accept the various metaphysical arguments/subjective conceptions of the good/actual societal norms of the various theories. The reason these theories are not followable for O'Neill is that there are people within the relevant scope who cannot adopt them, in the sense that it is not a real option for those people. It must be noted that these non-Kantian theories still fulfill the weak standard of followability: it is still conceivable in some weak sense that everyone could become Platonists or utilitarians, for example.
However, it is evident that if we accept this strong sense of followability, O'Neill's own theory fails to meet this standard. There are plenty of people for whom the adoption of Kantian constructivism is not a real psychological or intellectual option. Furthermore, the reasoning which O'Neill employs to reject her rivals also fails to be properly reasoned, since it is clearly not followable by all relevant others (in the strong sense).
The only way that O'Neill can rescue her own theory is by instead applying a weak sense of followability: but this means that all the rival theories will be followable too. Followability thus loses its critical bite.
Secondly, I will examine whether the concept of followability can be repaired by seeing whether either the strong or weak senses of followability can provide useful restrictions on thought to count as reasoned. I will also examine the possibility of considering idealised followability (ie acceptable to all ideally rational agents in the positions of the people concerned). I will argue that O'Neill is right to explicitly reject this idea.
Finally, I will look at why O'Neill's requirement of followability is a desirable one in the first place. I will note that accepting that a being has moral significance does not commit us to according it discursive standing. I will accept that according moral agents discursive standing has strong instrumental value in protecting things of non-instrumental value. However, I will argue that being included within the scope of justification has no intrinsic value of its own. Therefore, while followability is a useful consideration for moral theories, it cannot be used as a restriction on reasoned thought.
[If I run out of things to say, I may also discuss the O'Neill's problems with determining the scope of "practical" reasoning in a non-circular manner]
In my essay I intend to examine the requirement of followability which O'Neill argues is fundamental for thought to count as reasoned. O'Neill claims that anything that is to count as reasoning must be followable (or, at various times, intelligible, acceptable, accessible or cogent) to all relevant others.
Firstly, I will consider the way O'Neill actually uses the concept, since O'Neill's description of the concept on its own appears too vague and chimerical to be a meaningful requirement on reasoned thought. I will argue that an examination of the way O'Neill actually deploys the requirement against rival theories will reveal that O'Neill trades heavily upon an equivocation in her concept of followability. It appears that there are two possible senses in which O'Neill uses followability:
- Weak standard: thought is followable if it is conceivable that all relevant others adopt the set of beliefs; that it would not be inconsistent for them to accept the set of beliefs (whether or not actually adopting the set of beliefs is a real psychological or intellectual option for them).
- Strong standard: thought is followable if adopting the set of beliefs is conceivable in the sense that it is a real psychological or intellectual option for all relevant others.
And it is indeed this strong sense of followability which O'Neill appears to rely upon when she concludes that all non-Kantian-constructivist moral theories are not followable by all relevant others. These theories are not followable because, O'Neill argues, they appear arbitrary or incomprehensible to people who do not accept the various metaphysical arguments/subjective conceptions of the good/actual societal norms of the various theories. The reason these theories are not followable for O'Neill is that there are people within the relevant scope who cannot adopt them, in the sense that it is not a real option for those people. It must be noted that these non-Kantian theories still fulfill the weak standard of followability: it is still conceivable in some weak sense that everyone could become Platonists or utilitarians, for example.
However, it is evident that if we accept this strong sense of followability, O'Neill's own theory fails to meet this standard. There are plenty of people for whom the adoption of Kantian constructivism is not a real psychological or intellectual option. Furthermore, the reasoning which O'Neill employs to reject her rivals also fails to be properly reasoned, since it is clearly not followable by all relevant others (in the strong sense).
The only way that O'Neill can rescue her own theory is by instead applying a weak sense of followability: but this means that all the rival theories will be followable too. Followability thus loses its critical bite.
Secondly, I will examine whether the concept of followability can be repaired by seeing whether either the strong or weak senses of followability can provide useful restrictions on thought to count as reasoned. I will also examine the possibility of considering idealised followability (ie acceptable to all ideally rational agents in the positions of the people concerned). I will argue that O'Neill is right to explicitly reject this idea.
Finally, I will look at why O'Neill's requirement of followability is a desirable one in the first place. I will note that accepting that a being has moral significance does not commit us to according it discursive standing. I will accept that according moral agents discursive standing has strong instrumental value in protecting things of non-instrumental value. However, I will argue that being included within the scope of justification has no intrinsic value of its own. Therefore, while followability is a useful consideration for moral theories, it cannot be used as a restriction on reasoned thought.
[If I run out of things to say, I may also discuss the O'Neill's problems with determining the scope of "practical" reasoning in a non-circular manner]
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